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Abstract: This paper will discuss how narrative arguments should be evaluated, i.e. I will offer a means of 
differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable narrative arguments. I will argue that narrative arguments 
should not be evaluated as products; hence, narrative argument evaluation will be a rhetorical evaluation focused on 
the process.  In line with the rhetorical model of argument evaluation, I develop an account of the virtuous audience, 
which will be the standard for assessing narrative arguments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the question of how to evaluate narrative arguments. I will be discussing 
how to evaluate narrative arguments as process as opposed to arguments as product, as with 
dominant accounts of argument appraisal such as informal logic. The first part of this paper will 
show that dominant accounts of argument evaluation are not suitable for the evaluation of 
narrative arguments because they focus on the product of argument. The second part of the paper 
will develop an account of argument evaluation for arguments as process, that is the virtuous 
audience, which will combine the rhetorical understanding of audience with virtue 
argumentation. The virtuous audience cultivates argumentative virtues that help them assess 
good and bad arguments and allow them to reject racist and misogynistic arguments. For the sake 
of brevity, I will focus on the goals of assessment that relate to cultivating virtues that avoid the 
acceptance of dangerous stories such as racist or misogynistic stories. 
 
2. Preliminaries                
 
Before proceeding, some preliminary clarifications are in order. I define a narrative argument as 
a story told in the context of dissensus or disagreement. The type of narrative I will be discussing 
is an oral and interpersonal storytelling, which takes place in conversations between at least two 
people and hence it is dialogical.  I will not discuss narrative as it is used in novels, but rather in 
the act of dialogical and interactive storytelling, which is essentially communal, social and 
interpersonal. Since my account of narrative argument focuses on interactive personal narrative, 
rather than written and/or novel argument, my focus will be on the process of arguing. By 
narrative process I refer to the whole interaction in which the story is used as an argument, 
including such components as body language, tone, context, audience, background and shared 
history. Narrative arguments do not arise in solitary monologues, but are usually part of a larger 
interaction. Narrative argumentation is a dynamic and interactive process that happens between 
the arguer and the audience. Narratives arise in conversations in response to something said or an 
argument made, and so they are integrated into the whole interaction. Narrative is often used 
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alongside other modes of arguing such as the visceral (physical), kisceral (intuitive) and 
emotional mode discussed and developed by Michael Gilbert (1997, p. 75).   
 By product and process of argument, I am referring to the old and contested distinction in 
argumentation literature which was first introduced by Daniel J. O’keefe in 1992. O’keefe 
distinguishes between the concept of arguing (which is the process) and the argument that results 
from the process of arguers engaged in arguing (which is the product of arguing). O’keefe calls 
these two features, i.e., the product and process of argument, ‘argument 1’ and ‘argument 2.’ 
Argument 1 refers to the content, what is being said in the argument which is the product of 
arguing and argument 2 refers to the process, mode, or act of arguing (O’keefe, p. 4). The 
product of argument is also sometimes referred to as a thing or an object, whereas the process of 
argument is referred to as an interaction. This distinction has been both popular and controversial 
among argumentation scholars, but it is an intuitive and helpful distinction, and I will assume it 
in what follows. This distinction is helpful in explaining how argument evaluation has been 
divided in terms of evaluating the product of argument or the process of arguing as in the 
rhetorical tradition. And so, I will be discussing only narrative arguments as process—a 
dissensual and dialogical exchange between two or more people, with multiple integrated but 
conceptually distinguishable modes built into the argumentative context. I will argue that this 
type of narrative cannot be evaluated using traditional methods—it calls for a distinct evaluative 
framework. 
 
3. Dominant account of argument evaluation 
 
In this part of the paper, I will explain dominant accounts of argument appraisal and show how 
they are not useful for assessing narrative arguments.  
Traditionally, argument evaluation was taken to refer to normatively evaluating whether a 
conclusion is acceptable or whether the reasons provided are sufficient to warrant the acceptance 
of the conclusion. There are several such theories of argument evaluation, two of the main ones 
being the informal logical perspective and the pragma dialectical perspective. The informal 
logical perspective focuses on evaluating the product, i.e., the argument as consisting of premises 
and a conclusion. Informal logicians evaluate arguments based on three requirements that an 
argument must satisfy to be good, namely relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (RSA) 
(Johnson 2000, p. 191). The RSA model cannot apply to narrative arguments because most of the 
criteria focus on premises and their relationship to the conclusion, which requires that we extract 
premises and conclusion from the narrative. This is problematic because once you reduce the 
narrative to premises and conclusion, it loses some of its persuasive power. This is partly 
because, when reduced to a product, narrative arguments lose important evidential content, such 
as emotional and physical content. This affects the perceived legitimacy of the argument. Also, 
the narrative argument becomes a different type of argument once it is taken out of its original 
form and structure. Once the argument is captured into the form of premises and conclusion, it 
does not tell us anything about the process of arguing, and often omits important features of the 
argument in an effort to reduce and capture the ordinary argument into a rigid form of premise 
and conclusion. 
Another prominent approach to argument evaluation comes from the dialectical 
approach, an example of which is the pragma dialectical theory of Frans van Eemeren, Rob 
Grootendorst and the Amsterdam school. The pragma dialectical approach investigates the 
procedures that are involved in the argumentative exchange and looks at whether the 
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argumentative rules have been followed. The pragma dialecticians are interested in testing theses 
through critical discussion.  Hence, according to pragma dialectics a good argument is a well-
regulated critical discussion, which involves four stages: the confrontation stage, opening stage, 
argumentation stage and the concluding stage. The discussion is governed by a code of conduct 
in the form of argumentative rules.  This approach stipulates that if arguers ignore or violate 
argumentative rules, the argumentative exchange can result in fallacies (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, and Henkemans 2002, p. 182). Some of the rules for critical discussion include the 
following: 
 
Freedom rule: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward 
standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.        
Unexpressed premise rule: A party may not falsely present something as a 
premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that 
he himself has left implicit.  
Argument scheme rule: A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively 
defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate 
argumentation scheme that is correctly applied. 
Validity rule: The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or 
capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises. 
(Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Henkemans 2002, pp. 182-183) 
 
Most of the rules are difficult to apply to narrative arguments because even though the pragma 
dialectical approach looks at argument as an interaction and certainly has some good rules such 
as the freedom rule which is useful to any type of argument including narrative, nevertheless 
pragma dialectical rules still relates to argumentation that is structured and rigid in form which 
narrative argument is not. Further, the narrative argument would have to be turned into a critical 
discussion in order to apply the rules of critical discussion to it. However, narrative argument is a 
complex activity that cannot be narrowed down into the four stages of a critical discussion 
without losing its persuasive and powerful force embedded in its narrative form. Narrative 
arguments are not structured and therefore cannot follow the four stages of critical discussion. 
Further, changing narrative into a critical discussion runs into the same problem of reduction that 
the informal logic approach poses.  
It must be acknowledged that both the informal logic and pragma dialectics provide 
worthy accounts of argument appraisal and are surely useful for evaluating many kinds of 
arguments especially traditional types of arguments, but my contention is that these approaches 
are not applicable or suitable to narrative because I am not interested in dissecting the narrative 
into argument parts. I avoid compartmentalizing narrative argument because 1. the whole 
narrative is an argumentative act and 2. narrative parts are all meshed together and cannot be 
broken down into separate parts. And as mentioned earlier, doing so risks changing the argument 
and losing it is persuasive power.  
While there is a tendency among argumentation scholars to ignore the process of arguing 
when assessing arguments, rhetorical approaches and the recent development of virtue 
argumentation do attempt to evaluate an argument in terms of the process and practices of 
argument, yet they also have their setbacks. For example, while virtue argumentation theories do 
look at the process—though in a very limited way, as I will later show—they ignore the 
audience. However, it is both the arguer and the audience that form the full dynamic of 
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argumentation. Because narrative argument evaluation, as I conceive of it, focuses on the process 
of arguing and the cultivation of virtues, it will combine insights from both the rhetorical and 
virtue theories of argumentation.  
 
4. The virtuous audience 
 
The virtuous audience borrows from the rhetorical understanding of audiences, most notably 
Chaim Perelman’s account, which is the most thorough and renowned account of audience in 
rhetorical argumentation. Similar to Perelman’s rhetorical account of audiences, the virtuous 
audience is interactive and is very much involved in the construction and outcome of the 
argument. That is because the argument is adapted to the audience. Arguers begin with 
agreement that is shared with the audience and hence the audience plays a role in how the 
argument begins and ends. Similarly, the virtuous audience essentially includes both the arguer 
and interlocutor. The virtuous audience is involved with the arguer and is not this remote, 
distanced and detached entity that only listens to or receives the argument. Rather, the virtuous 
audience is an active participant in argumentation and is never passive or merely a recipient of 
the argument. 
Since rhetoric sees argumentation as a relationship that forms between the arguer and 
their audience, both interlocutors are important for argument analysis. The rhetorical perspective 
emphasizes how arguments are experienced by the audience (Tindale 2004, p. xi). Rhetoric goes 
beyond the product of argument to include the different modalities and modes the arguer uses to 
adapt her argument to the audience and situation. And so it is more fitted for narrative 
arguments. 
Another aspect of the rhetorical account of audience that I apply to a virtuous audience is 
that the audience is the measure of argument much like Perleman’s understanding of audience. 
From the rhetorical perspective, a good argument is one that is effective and persuasive to an 
audience. This is why the rhetorical approach is interested in adapting arguments to audiences in 
order to gain their agreement and adherence. According to Perelman an argument is as worthy as 
its audience. Perelman draws a distinction between two types of audiences: the particular and the 
universal. While the particular audience addresses segments of society, small or particular 
groups, the universal audience addresses all of humanity, more importantly all rational human 
beings. As such, Perelman makes clear that a discourse that appeals to reason is one that is 
appealing to the universal audience because such an audience is a reasonable and rational one 
(1982, p. 17).  And so the difference in these audiences is actually a difference in the goals of 
argumentation. Discourse addressed to small groups (specific audiences) aims to persuade; 
whereas discourse aimed at larger groups, i.e. the universal audience, aims to convince 
(Perelman, 1982, p. 18). The appeal to particular audience is an appeal to particular 
characteristics and situations occupying a particular space and time whereas the universal 
audience relates to argumentation that transcends all those particularities and makes a broader 
appeal (Crosswhite 1989, p. 158).  
 Narrative arguments are assessed by the listener, that is the audience. The virtuous 
audience is rhetorical because stories are often adapted to the audience. When we tell stories we 
do so by ensuring that our stories are going to be believed by the audience. Depending on the 
audience, different stories may be acceptable or rejected. Narrative arguments are co-created 
between the arguer and the audience. That is why the storyteller also needs to adapt his story to 
the audience and the context and situation as he /she sees fit. The teller knows that if the story is 
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far fetched and does not rely on a shared conception of reasonableness, it risks being rejected by 
the audience.  The narrative argument is part of the whole interaction and is not a solitary 
occurrence. In an argumentative setting where disagreement has arisen, stories are usually 
introduced in response to a point made or question asked and are thus integrated with ongoing 
talk and debate, and because stories are very much integrated and woven in the whole interaction 
between arguers, they often are adapted and rely on background knowledge shared by the 
disputant in the interaction.  When we tell stories we do so within shared conceptions of 
reasonableness. 
Stories rely on shared history and background assumptions of what is reasonable, and this 
standard of reasonableness varies form particular to universal. And so we can draw the 
comparison to particular and universal audiences in relation to narrative in that some narratives 
have a more universal appeal as they speak to a common human experience such as narratives of 
loss or grief. But other narratives may be particular in nature, such as narratives that appeal only 
to a narrow and dangerous ideology and may be said to be particular in that regard in that they 
only appeal to small segments of humanity, perhaps the segment of humanity that is misogynistic 
or racist. While the universal and particular audience can help us shed light on how certain 
stories are accepted by appealing to a specific audience, it does not really help us to cultivate 
practices where the audience can be more critical in their judgment of stories. While Perelman’s 
account of particular and universal may help us understand that dangerous stories are accepted 
because they appeal to limited and narrow audiences, which he refers to as the particular, it does 
not help us to rule out the possibility of accepting dangerous narratives. Whereas cultivating 
argumentative virtues does. While Perelman does say that the universal audience would not 
accept bigoted beliefs, he does not tell us how such audiences come to be more discerning in       
their judgment. I argue that it is through virtues developed by the audience that one can become 
more discerning and reject dangerous narratives.  
Perelman’s account of audiences does not tell us how one can come to develop the skills 
or competence to achieve more universality in arguing. However, the one way Perelman 
addresses skills is in relation to the universal audience, specifically the reasonableness of the 
universal audience who he says in their “judgment and conduct is influenced by common sense” 
(Fisher 1986, p. 89). He also claims that the universal audience has proper competence, which 
means being “disposed to hear” the argument, “submit to the data of experience,” and have the 
proper information and training to ultimately be “duly reflected” (Crosswhite 1989, p. 163). 
However, it is not clear what proper competence entails. I argue that the proper competence 
Perelman suggests can be understood in terms of argumentative virtues. Hence, while Perelman’s 
account of the universal audience has the merit of attempting to attain more inclusivity, it does 
not tell us how one can come to develop the skills or competence to achieve more universality in 
arguing.  More must be said about what makes an arguer move from the particularities of the 
situation to a more universal stance, and that is where I think the virtuous audience may have 
more to say.  I argue that it is through virtues developed by the audience that one can become 
more discerning and reject dangerous narratives. Having good argumentative practices allows us 
to argue well, which reduces the probability of accepting bad narratives. Hence, the main 
difference between Perelman’s account of audience and the virtuous audience is the focus on 
virtues. And second, I distinguish between audience in terms of virtue rather than the particular 
or universal.   
Next I will explain the virtues that an audience needs to cultivate in order to be able to 
reject dangerous narratives. The virtuous audience evaluating the narrative are not passive 
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recipients, and are, in fact, critical and have virtues that aid them in differentiating between 
dangerous and acceptable arguments. To discuss the virtues that must be cultivated by the 
audience, I now turn to virtue argumentation. 
 
5. Virtue argumentation  
 
Virtue ethics is a new, burgeoning approach to argumentation that concerns itself with the ethical 
character of arguers. A virtue approach to argumentation was proposed by Daniel Cohen and 
Andrew Aberdeen in 2007, and has since expanded. The list of Argumentation virtues is not 
exhaustive and it is still being developed simply because virtue argumentation is a new 
argumentation theory.  Most of the virtues developed by Cohen and Aberdeen can be applied to 
the virtuous audience such as: 
 
Willingness to engage in argumentation 
Being communicative 
Faith in reason 
  Intellectual courage  
sense of duty 
Willingness to listen to others 
Intellectual empathy 
Insight into persons  
Insight into problems 
Insight into theories  
Fair-mindedness 
Justice 
Fairness in evaluating others’ arguments 
Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence 
Recognition of reliable authority  
Recognition of salient facts  
Sensitivity to detail  
Willingness to question the obvious 
Appropriate respect for public opinion 
Autonomy 
Intellectual perseverance  
Diligence 
Care  
   Thoroughness (Aberdein 2010, p.175).  
 
Other virtues that I will add to this list relate to the audience in particular as for example 
having a fair intention which is the intention to take the other person seriously and not to think of 
them as idiotic or insane.  In other words, it means having the intention to view one another as 
intelligent and capable by giving them a fair chance and not dismissing them immediately. 
Fairness in intention is similar to an already existing virtue developed by Aberdeen and Cohen 
which is fairness in evaluating others’ arguments. What is different between those virtues is that 
one focuses on the evaluation of another’s argument, while the other, i.e. the virtue of fair 
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intention focuses on having a good intention when entering arguments which includes both 
evaluating the argument but also how one perceives another as either intelligent or incompetent.  
But this virtue also needs to be balanced with another virtue which is critical trust. This 
virtue requires that one look for cues of coherence and intelligibility in the story and credibility 
in the teller. Hence, the two virtues I would add to the list include fair intention and critical trust.  
Current accounts of virtue argumentation have focused on the arguer cultivating virtues 
while ignoring the crucial role of the audience which is also needed for not only the production 
but also the evaluation of good arguments. That is, the virtues developed by Aberdeen and 
Cohen relate only to the virtuous arguer. However, I argue that these virtues need to be also 
developed by the audience because it is the audience that is judging the argument, and therefore 
needs to have certain set of virtues in order to reject bad narrative in the case of storytelling. As 
such, I build on the current development of virtue argumentation by introducing the role of the 
virtuous audience. That is because, focusing solely on the virtues of the arguer to the exclusion 
of the audience will not help us in evaluating the argument. Further, the emphasis on virtuous 
audience highlights the importance of argumentation as a dynamic process and a shared 
responsibility between the speaker and the audience.  
Assessing the narrative through the virtuous audience allows us to maintain the form of 
the narrative as narrative without having to reduce it to premise and conclusion as with act based 
argument appraisal that focus on the product of arguing. It is only through assessing a narrative 
as process that we can avoid the reduction problem associated with act based argument appraisal.  
Act based argument appraisals such as informal logic fits more with the notion of arguments as a 
product. That is because in order for one to assess whether an argument is cogent, one needs to 
deconstruct it into promise and conclusion. And it requires looking at the relationship between 
the premises and the conclusion.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The virtuous audience is a rhetorical audience who has cultivated virtues. The rhetorical 
audience includes both the arguer and the audience because narrative is a co-creation between 
those engaged in the argument. My concept of the virtuous audience combines insights form 
Perelman’s account of audiences and virtue theories of argumentation. While bad narratives do 
get accepted by people it is only through the virtuous audience that we can hope these stories get 
rejected. The virtuous audience, if they are critical, then they are less likely to accept bad 
narratives. Bad narratives are more persuasive and powerful than one would like to imagine and 
that ultimately depends on the type of audience that accepts them. Hence, good narrative 
arguments are those that are accepted by the virtuous audience. Ultimately though for good 
argumentation to take place and to avoid the production and acceptance of bad narratives, what is 
required is the cultivation of virtues by both the arguer and the audience.  
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